Field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) become very popular for embedded cryptographic operations. In order to resist side-channel attacks, FPGAs must implement reasoned countermeasures. The most efficient way to mitigate attacks is to adopt a gate-level protection. Two secure gates families exist: those that "hide" and those that "mask" side-channel leakage.
INTRODUCTION
High-end markets often resort to FPGAs because these devices are affordable for small to medium volumes. The applications targeted by these markets require that data are handled with confidentiality. Cryptographic techniques are therefore used to protect the device internal data. However, side-channels [1] attacks are known to and have proved concretely to wreak havoc with any cryptographic scheme. Cryptographic applications thus need to be carefully protected against any kind of sneak attack that exploit whatsoever physical leak. Two families of protections have been put forward in the literature.
Masked logics resort to an external random number generator to mislead any statistical attack. They have been widely studied [2, 3] . However, those "masking" countermeasures have many weaknesses: the random source must be unbiased, second order attacks can be devised and the presence of glitches [4] and the early evaluation [5] still remain a difficult problem to solve.
Hiding logics, such as wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL, [6] ), have been seldom studied in FPGAs. Some results on combinatorial functions are reported in [7] . Area performances for a complete algorithm are detailed in [8] although little is said about synthesis optimization.
The goal of this article is to shed a new light on WDDL netlists optimizations by using an improved synthesis flow.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The projection of a design into positive WDDL logic is detailed in Sec. 2. The principle of area optimizations is also discussed in this section. We then apply optimizations to the whole DES [9] in Sec. 3 . Then, we show in Sec. 4 that non-linear parts of the algorithms can be compacted using heuristics. Finally, the section 5 concludes on the area gain (namely −23 %) obtained with the techniques exposed in the paper.
METHODOLOGY
In the article [10] , the authors propose methods to compact specifically a DES or a triple-DES hardware description. They use manual re-clustering and some peculiarities of the target FPGA (a Xilinx Virtex-II) to achieve area optimizations. For instance, the SSR (usage of LUT memory to store some ROM or some shift registers) functionality, proprietary of Xilinx, is taken advantage of in order to implement the bit shifts needed for the key schedule routine.
Instead, we intend to provide device-agnostic methods to compact portable design flows. Our flow is suitable for Xilinx, Altera, Lattice and Actel products. The basic structure we assume is that depicted in Fig. 1 . It is available for all the FPGAs sold by the four major vendors listed above. 
Related Works
Power-constant logics are secure only provided the backend is also balanced. This has been emphasized in many previous ASIC experiments, such as asynchronous [11] or synchronous [12, 13] logic. However, without routing constraints, place-and-route algorithms (based on simulated annealing and/or A*) will treat dual gates and dual wires in the same fashion. Indeed, for each direct gate, one dual gate exists. And for each direct wire, one dual wire also exists. Therefore, statistical algorithm are not expected to favor one gate or one net of a couple for another one. This explains why, at first order, the backend is naturally balanced. Notice however, that at second order, dedicated place and route methods must be used (if available). Such a method has been presented for the first time by Pengyuan Yu and Patrick Schaumont in [14] . The contribution of this paper is to be a design-independent method to obtain secure implementations in FPGA from both logical and physical point of views.
In [15] a method to implement DES in masked logic is described. The bottleneck of secured implementations of symmetric ciphers is the overhead of the transformed substitution box (sbox). It is suggested in [15] to use memories in this respect. Using memories is a wise solution, since these precious resources are otherwise wasted. Furthermore, it enables for sboxes customization without recompiling the design. The characteristics (e.g. performances, area footprint) remain the same whatever the sbox. However, using memories forbids to secure the backend, since the pathes to the true and false halves of the memory are unbalanced.
Synthesis Flow To Get a Positive Differential Netlist
To achieve differential and glitch-free netlists, only monotonic (e.g. positive) cells must be used. As FPGA CAD tool cannot be constrained to use only some logical functions, they are not suitable to synthesize secure designs. Instead, ASIC synthesizers are used. These tools require all the same the presence of an inverter. To indicate that it can be freely used, we reduce its to zero. Therefore, the synthesizer does not feel any penalty when using it. This is much desired, since in dual-rail netlists, the inversion of a couple of wires (a t , a f ) is simply a wire-crossing˜(a t , a f ) = (a f , a t ). Other gates are all equivalent in terms of cost: they are attributed the same (e.g. unitary) area. We studied heterogeneous strategies, that turned out to be worse than the uniform area cost. Notably, the combinatorial alone, the DFF alone, and the combined combinatorial+DFF have the same area, because this is a reality in FPGAs.
Area Optimization Techniques
We use in this paper several area optimization techniques:
• Source code modification (RTL description style). Indeed, synthesizers are sensitive to the coding style.
• Identify static signals (e.g. registers enables), and simplify them (enables are free in FPGAs). This optimization is indeed device-agnostic.
• Pack the registers with orphan logic gates, that were inferred as stand-alone gates by the ASIC synthesizer.
We separate the treatment of linear and non-linear parts of the DES design. In the rest of the article, we take the example of the architecture described in Fig. 6 of [16] .
DES LINEAR PARTS

Combinatorial Parts
The ASIC synthesizer Cadence bgx shell infers positive multiplexers as 2×2 Lut4 gates. Using the Cadence rc synthesizer, two-input multiplexers are properly inferred as 2 LUT4 gates. The other awkward syntheses of bgx shell are studied in Sec. 4 as for non-linear DES parts.
Sequential Parts
FPGA design is very different from ASIC design, in the sense that DFFs can be considered as free resources in FPGAs. Indeed, every elementary computation grain (cf. Fig. 1 ) contains one flip-flop. This means that DFFs are much often underutilized in FPGAs.
For this reason, it is tempting to replace single-ended every DFF (either initialized to '0' or '1') by a cluster depicted in Fig. 2 . These structures are indeed suitable for WDDL, because they are differential and have two stages, to memorize simultaneously the precharge token and the actual dualrail data.
However, this choice is misleading when the DFFs are enabled (e.g. to save energy when the module is not working): the built-in enable (cf Fig. 1 ) cannot be used, and an external one is thus required, as shown on top of Fig. 3 . It is wiser to have in the ASIC library of cells sequential elements that are "enabled". The adequate description for a compact "DFF with enable" is depicted in bottom of Fig. 3 . The contents of the ASIC library of cells that allow to take advantage of the enable signal present in FPGAs sequential elements is given in Tab. 1. Notice that the description of a pure combinatorial function (item 3) and of a mixed combinatorial+DFF cell (item 4) differs because timing arcs are different. The table 2 provides snippets for the pure AND and the AND+DFF cells, expressed in LIBERTY [18] .
Indeed, this strategy allows to save 1, 104 LUT4s:
• (64 + 64 + 56) × 4 registers (namely LR, CD and IF, see [16] ), that are packed with existing logic,
• (64+64+56)×2 multiplexors (muxs), that are turned into enabled registers (cf. Fig. 3) 
DES NON-LINEAR PARTS
Synthesis with Legacy ASIC Tools
In [8] , the synthesis in LUT4 positive logic of DES sboxes (6 → 4 random tables) is shown to always be larger than a manual mapping 1 We present a technique to reach sometimes more compact DES sboxes using legacy ASIC synthesizers. It consists in:
• using a coarse-level synthesizer, that breaks the design into non-positive gates, and then in • using a fine-level synthesizer, that remaps all the nonpositive instances into a sub-netlist of positive gates. This last step involves an automatic re-clustering to factor positive gates of adjacent sub-netlists that do not use all their inputs.
This re-entrant synthesis technique is illustrated in Fig. 4 for 4 inputs primary synthesis, using quartus as a coarse synthesizer.
/ ** In combinatorial instances, the function is expressed in the output pin * / pin( y ) { direction: output; function: "a0 * a1"; timing() { related_pin: "a1 a0"; intrinsic_rise: 1; intrinsic_fall: 1; } } / ** In sequential instances, the function is expressed in the internal state * / ff( iq, iqn ) { clocked_on : "clk"; next_state : "ena * (a0 * a1)+ena' * iq"; clear : "clr'"; preset : "pre'"; } pin( y ) { direction: output ; capacitance : 0 ; function : "iq"; timing() { related_pin: "clk"; timing_type: rising_edge; intrinsic_rise: 1; intrinsic_fall: 1; } } Table 2 . Expression of pure combinatorial (top) and of mixed combinatorial+sequential (bottom) logic in LIBERTY format.
As for DES sboxes, we have experienced the performance of two synthesizers (for the re-entrant synthesis), namely bgx shell and rc from Cadence, tuned to spend the maximal effort on the area optimization. Additionally, we tested four HDL styles:
S: NIST original description,
T:
The two-bit line decoder is put forward, whereas the four 4 → 4 bijections are left tabulated, U: assign statement in a linearly decoded way, V: case statement in a linearly decoded way.
The synthesis results are shown in Tab. 3, respectively for 4, 3, 2 primary synthesis level. The figures in boldface are better than the state-of-the-art (130 positive LUT4 reported in [8] ). We observe that HDL description style (either U, V, S or T) and synthesizers choice impact the quality of the netlist. However, no breakthrough is obtained. We continue with a heuristic synthesis methods, that happens to be very efficient.
Heuristic
A LUT being structured as a tree of 2-input multiplexers, a simple way to get positive functions is to use a tree of "positive" multiplexers in differential logic. A positive multiplexer is such that the selection variable sel is composed of the couple (sel t , sel f ) where the index t , as "true", indicates the non inverted signal and the index f , as "false", indicates the inverted signal. These two signals are reset at zero during the precharge phase of the differential logic as explained in [19] . The positive WDDL multiplexer equation is then: The heuristic consists in simplifying the first two columns driven by the two LSBs variables a and b associated with their dual rail signals (a t , a f ) and (b t , b f ). Actually only sixteen positive multiplexers are enough to generate all the functions of two positive variables. Hence the way to feed the third column inputs driven by c consists in a specific routing from these sixteen functions. Moreover there are six trivial functions which need not to be generated, because they are trivial and can therefore be implemented with pure routing: 0, 1, a t , a f , b t , b f . This preprocessor, hereafter called "global function generator", needs only ten LUT4 cells and is global to the four sbox outputs. Hence the total number of cells for a complete sbox is: 10 + (8 + 4 + 2 + 1) × 2 × 4 = 130. The originality of this heuristic is to share cells between the true and false parts. This helps save area, without compromising the security. If we note T the set of non-trivial two-input gates, then ∀f ∈ T, f ∈ T , where f is the complementary of f . Therefore, the constant activity condition is met.
Specific Sboxes Optimizations
The tree of cells which is driven by the four MSB variables cdef receives sixteen functions x i routed specifically from the global function generator. This MSB tree can be optimized by considering the four differential sbox outputs together.
Optimizations A & B
The first optimization (A) consists merely in removing the cell of column c if x 2i = x 2i+1 . In this case the LUT which is a positive multiplexer can be removed and leave place to and (x 2i+1 = x 2j+1 ). In case of identity, a factorization can be done and one cell is removed.
Security Analysis of the Optimizations
Once again, we notice that the optimizations do not jeopardize the constant-activity condition mandatory for WDDL to be secure. Indeed, if the same Boolean variable f is computed in both the true and the false netlists halves, then the dual g of f exists in the both networks. Therefore, the optimizations consists in transforming 2 × (f, g) (which is obviously functionally redundant) into 1 × (f, g). The last couple remains constant in activity, and so do not disclose their individual value. As an example, the balancedness of optimization B is illustrated in Fig. 5 . In this figure,
Hence a pairwise optimization, that does not unbalance the dual networks. In order to further improve the security of the netlists, it is desirable to respect at the layout level the symmetry at the netlist level [20] . This requires to form couples between dual instances. We attract the reader's attention to the danger of forming couples before the optimization. Indeed, the optimization consists in removing two multiplexors by the same token, as explained in Fig. 5 . However, depending on the optimization implementation (descent in the graph representing the netlist), the two multiplexors can be removed from two different couples. This is illustrated in Fig. 6: (a) the two related muxs are removed from the same couple C 1 , which leaves a secure set of couples, (b) the two related muxs are removed from two different couples (C 1 and C 2 ), leave the dual muxs in two different couples, which does not guarantee that they will be placed and routed in a balanced way. To avoid this pitfall, we therefore suggest to form the couples after the optimization. Afterwards, we recognize multiplexors to place in the same couple by the analysis of the function they compute.
Results
Optimizations are done by permuting the inputs value of each sbox in order to find the optimum. Table 4 indicates the overall gain for every sbox of DES. A total of 292 LUT4s can be saved. The functionality of the netlists has been proved by their actual programmation in a Stratix EP1S25.
CONCLUSIONS
The design of cryptographic applications in FPGA require the use of secure logics. We have illustrated how to implement an area-efficient hiding logic style, called positive WDDL. We provide for a LUT usage gain of 1, 104 LUT4s as for linear (registers, cf Sec. 3) logic and 292 LUT4s as for non-linear logic (sboxes only, cf Sec. 4). The overall area saving is equal to:
6,038−1,104−292 6,038 = 4,642 6,038 = 77 % . This means that a 23 % surface optimization is made possible by packing registers and optimizing sboxes synthesis.
